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The rising level of executive remuneration (compensation) is in the focus once again. 
Economist and legal analysts frequently come up with the question: “how shall the system of 
executive remuneration represent a sustainable structure of corporate conduct where the aspects of 
strategic approach ensures a long term development?” In 2008-2009 AIG’s remuneration scandal 
(also known as the bonus gate scandal) highlighted that the federal aid received by the financial 
institution partially served remuneration interests. In addition to the “bonus payments” made to the 
company’s own executives, the fact that AIG provided a portion of the federal aid to other financial 
institutions, including European banks, aroused general indignation. Meanwhile, the European 
Union (concerning the financial sphere) and Switzerland (concerning corporations generally) took 
a stand on reconsideration of the issue, even by limiting executive remuneration packages. This 
paper would like to review major theories on the application of remuneration packages and also the 
concerning regulation at the level of recommendations.
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I. PURPoSE of REMUnERAtIon 
Prior to the description of the individual means of remuneration, we consider 
it necessary to present the objectives their application aims to achieve. These 
objectives are also outlined by the British UK Corporate Governance Code 
within its own regulatory scope. According to the UK Corporate Governance 
Code, the purpose of remuneration is to attract, retain and motivate directors 
of the quality required to run the company successfully, but a company should 
avoid paying more than is necessary for this purpose. Thus, the objective is to 
establish a rather delicate balance.1 Similar phrasing is used by the ASX Principles 
of Good Corporate Governance, when it sets forth the factors that need to be 
considered upon the determination of remuneration.2 In addition to the foregoing, 
1 See The UK Corporate Governance Code (2012)  D.1 (Main Principle)
Available at (November 10, 2012):,https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/a7f0aa3a-57dd-4341-b3e8-
ffa99899e154/UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-September-2012.aspx
2 See ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (with 2010 Amendments), 
Principle 8 Available at (November 10, 2012): http://www.asx.com.au/documents/about/cg_principles_
recommendations_with_2010_amendments.pdf, 
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the British UK Corporate Governance Code also emphasizes that the executive 
directors’ remuneration package should be structured so as to harmonize their 
interests with those of the shareholders, as well as to provide significant incentives 
to achieve the highest performance.3 In this respect the ASX Principles of Good 
Corporate Governance sets forth that remuneration should motivate corporate 
managers in the interest of fostering the long-term development and success of 
the company. Furthermore, it is also essential that remuneration be clearly linked 
to the performance of the directors.4
II. tHE APPLIcAtIon AnD SyStEM of tHE vARIoUS MEAnS 
of REMUnERAtIon In coDES of bESt PRActIcES AnD 
contRActS 
Upon the review of the regulatory efforts and the recommendations of the 
European Union concerning the remuneration of corporate executives, we 
consider it essential that henceforth the various remuneration elements constitute 
the subject of our analysis, with special regard to the stock exchange regulations 
applied in relation thereto. Naturally, the codes applied by stock exchanges 
(recommendations) are not legal regulations, thus they have no direct binding 
force (similarly to the EU recommendation issued in this respect), however, if 
a company disregards such codes, this may be indicative to investors and the 
markets. Below, we compare the content of three relevant codes (codes of best 
practices). Two of these codes – the Corporate Governance Recommendations 
of the BSE and the Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex – are based on the 
implementation of the EU recommendations. The third code, the ASX Principles 
of Good Corporate Governance was prepared outside the European Union, 
nevertheless, global trends in this respect direct the attention to the similarities. 
The observed tendency indicates a convergence of the content of investor 
requirements and corporate governance reforms.
In the context of the means of appropriate motivation and the objectives set 
thereby, we need to analyze the recommendations of corporate governance codes. 
The Corporate Governance Recommendations of the BSE – responding in part 
to the already raised issues – call the attention to the fact that the proportion 
of various interests should be determined in such a way that it encourages the 
beneficiaries to think strategically. Strategic thinking has a prominent role in 
respect of issues related to remuneration. In addition to ensuring appropriate 
motivation, remuneration arrangements and contracts should also prevent prompt, 
3 See The UK Corporate Governance Code (2012)
Available at (November 10, 2012): https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/a7f0aa3a-57dd-4341-b3e8-
ffa99899e154/UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-September-2012.aspx 
4 See ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (with 2010 Amendments) 
Principle 8. Available at (November 10, 2012): http://www.asx.com.au/documents/about/cg_principles_
recommendations_with_2010_amendments.pdf, 
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short-term share price maximization implemented in lack of actual foundations. 
In the case of supervisory board members, remuneration of a fixed amount is 
suggested, and it is suggested that their remuneration should not be connected to 
the share price. 
In relation to the individual remuneration elements, the ASX Principles of Good 
Corporate Governance emphasizes that most remuneration packages are based on 
the balance of fixed and incentive (varying according to performance) benefits, 
and proposes the consideration of the application of the following elements: 
fixed remuneration, performance based remuneration, share based remuneration, 
severance pay.5 
According to the Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex, the total 
remuneration of board members comprises monetary compensation elements, 
pension awards, other awards (in particular, those related to the termination of the 
activity), all types of fringe benefits (in excess of the salary), and benefits by third 
parties promised or granted in the financial year with regard to such person’s board 
activity. The monetary compensation elements shall comprise fixed and variable 
elements. Variable elements are the one-time, annually recurring components 
subject to business success, and long-term, incentive components including risk 
elements.6 
Management incentives should include both monetary and non-monetary 
elements (such as career orientation). In respect of the monetary remuneration 
of the management, the following elements are the most significant: salary and 
bonuses; share options and shares subject to a prohibition of alienation;7 further 
compensation elements; and the revaluation, re-pricing of existing shares and share 
options.8 Furthermore, pension arrangements, golden parachute arrangements,9 
and preferential loans are also to be listed under the above category. 
Additional income referred to in business jargon as perks (from perquisites) 
represent a significant remuneration element, which is however difficult to assess. 
These are incidental advantages provided to managers in excess of their benefits, 
frequently for the purpose of representation or comfort. Such perks are, for 
example, significant cost reimbursements, the use of the company’s aircraft or car, 
the use of luxury apartments. Moreover, these benefits may include the financing 
5 See ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (with 2010 Amendments) 
Box 8.1. Available at (March 28, 2011): http://www.asx.com.au/documents/about/cg_principles_
recommendations_with_2010_amendments.pdf,
6 See Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex 4.2.3 Available at (November 10, 2012):,http://www.
corporate-governance-code.de/eng/download/kodex_2012/D_CorGov_final_May_2012.pdf
7 The share subject to a prohibition on alienation cannot be alienated by the manager provided with 
such shares as compensation for a specified period of time. The original name of such shares is “non-
tradeable restricted stock”.
8 See HALL, Brian J. The Pay to Performance Incentives of Executive Stock Options. Working Paper 
6674. National Bureau of Economic Research. (1998) August, Page 9.  Available at: http://www. nber.org/
papers/w6674
9 Namely, the agreements on exorbitant severance packages, referred to as golden parachute 
arrangements.
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of health insurance policies where the insurance premium is above the average, or 
the offering of various club memberships. These benefits are typically in kind and 
not monetary advantages.10 It is to be noted that although less attention is given to 
them, their value may be substantial.
When establishing a system of remuneration elements, three fundamental 
categories can be determined: a) salary and benefits not subject to the company’s 
performance; b) options and other incentive compensation elements subject 
to the performance of the company’s shares; c) bonuses and other incentive 
compensation elements subject to the company’s performance, as compared to 
specific accounting indices.11 
The fixed component of executive compensation is fundamentally the base 
salary, however, variable components are also significant elements. These 
variable components may be subject to the resolution of the general meeting or the 
achievement (possibly surpassing) of the set objectives. In this respect the most 
frequent examples are share options (and option schemes), annual bonus payments 
and long-term incentive schemes (so-called LTIP), whereby the management can 
receive remuneration for its performance over a period of several years, instead of 
annual remuneration.12
The amount of annual bonus payments is traditionally determined on the basis 
of the company’s performance indices. These indices include, in particular, data 
based on accounting results, such as earnings, sales, or operating profit. Indices 
that may also be applied in this respect include return on equity,13 return on 
assets,14 return on investment,15 and economic value added.16
Long-term incentive schemes are remuneration elements similar to bonuses. 
However, long-term incentive schemes are provided by companies in consideration 
of performance over a period of several years. Such schemes can be illustrated for 
example by an arrangement that the bonus becomes payable, if the return on assets 
is at least 15% during 3 consecutive years. Long-term incentive schemes have less 
 
 
10 See RAJAN, Raghuram G. – WULF, Julie, Are Perks Purely Managerial Excess?. National 
Boureau of Economic Research. Working Paper No. 10494. May, 2004.  Available at: http://www.nber.
org/papers/w10494.pdf, 
11 See BAINBRIDGE, Stephen M., Book Review: Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Executive 
Compensation: Who Decides? – Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive 
Compensation (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2004), Texas Law Review, (2005) No. 83, Page 
1621
12 See CHEFFINS, Brian R. – THOMAS, Randall S., Should Shareholders Have a Greater Say Over 
Executive Pay? : Learning From the US Experience, Journal of Corporate Law Studies (2001) December, 
Page 278. 
13 ROE: Return on Equity
14 ROA: Return on Assets
15 ROI: Return on Investment
16 EVA: Economic Value Added See AGGARWAL, Rajesh, Executive Compensation and Corporate 
Controversy, Vermont Law Review (2003) No. 4, Pages 851-852.
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relevance on an annual basis, as they are to be taken into consideration, only if the 
specified performance objectives have been achieved.17 
The portfolio comprising the above described components in specific 
proportions constitutes the remuneration package of the manager (executive 
manager).
As it was observed by professors Charles Gibbons18 and Kevin J. Murphy, 
career-orientation may also have a significant incentive effect, as it can provide 
appropriate motivation for creating a unity of interest within the company. An 
optimal remuneration arrangement maximizes all incentives, including implicit 
incentives related to career- centered advancement, as well as explicit incentives 
related to the remuneration package. According to the findings of Gibbons 
and Murphy, at the initial stages of the career it is advisable to totally separate 
remuneration from performance, as the prospect of a long-term career represents 
sufficient incentive in itself. However, with the approach of retirement age these 
elements tend to be less efficient.19 In light of the research conducted by Bebchuk 
and Fried upon the shaping of remuneration arrangements it is essential to consider 
that it is not in the interest of executives to limit their own compensation. Their 
position is typically extremely secure, very few of them lose their jobs. As they hold 
key positions, they do not strive for advancement either, and if they continue their 
activity with another company, the volume of their current remuneration package 
provides them with further bargaining power in respect of salary arrangements.20 
Bebchuk and Fried consider the strengthening of the independence of the board of 
directors and the increasing of the power of the shareholders as countermeasures 
against abuses of severance pays. At the same time, not only higher transparency, 
but also stringer shareholder control should be achieved in this respect; namely, 
that shareholders may vote on certain elements of the compensation package, 
and at the voting held at the annual general meeting they can adopt resolutions 
of binding force in relation to compensation.21 Such authorization for control 
could significantly mitigate the key issue of the determination of management 
remuneration, namely, the advantages resulting from executive positions. However, 
the delegation of independent board members into the remuneration committees 
and the employment of independent remuneration experts only contribute to, but 
are not sufficient to eliminate the problem due to its complexity.22 
17 See AGGARWAL, Rajesh, Executive Compensation and Corporate Controversy, Vermont Law 
Review (2003) No. 4, Page 855.
18 Robert Gibbons, Professor at MIT Sloan School of Management.
19 See ALCOUFFE, Alain – ALCOUFFE, Christiane, Control and Executive Compensation in Large 
French Companies, Journal of Law and Society (1997) March, Page 87.
20 See MARTIN, Susan Lorde, Executive Compensation: Reining in Runaway Abuses-Again, 
University of San Francisco Law Review (2006) autumn, Pages 154-155.
21 See BEBCHUK, Lucian – FRIED, Jesse, Pay Without a Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of 
Executive Compensation (Harvard University Press, 2004), Pages 190-210.
22 See HILL, Jennifer – YABLON, Charles M., Corporate Governance and Executive Remuneration: 
Rediscovering Managerial Positional Conflict, University of New South Wales Law Journal (2002) No. 
2, Page 307.
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III. PERfoRMAncE bASED REMUnERAtIon  
AnD PERfoRMAncE InDIcES 
Remuneration practices have recently been revolutionized by two techniques 
in the United States, which have also gained ground worldwide. These techniques 
are, on the one hand, the performance based remuneration, and on the other 
hand, linked to the foregoing, remuneration by way of options, the incentive share 
options.23
Nowadays, the linking of remuneration to performance constitutes the 
fundamental principle of the compensation policy of large corporations. This 
tendency can be observed also in the Corporate Governance Recommendations 
of the BSE. The recommendation emphasizes that upon the determination of the 
remuneration, the responsibilities and the extent of the liability of the members 
must be taken into consideration. The extent to which the company was able to 
achieve its objectives, as well as its economic and financial condition are also to 
be taken into consideration.24 
Under the Deutcher Corporate Governance Kodex the full Supervisory Board 
determines the respective total compensation of the individual Management Board 
members. If there is a body which deals with Management Board contracts it 
shall submit proposals to the full Supervisory Board. The full Supervisory Board 
resolves the Management Board compensation system and reviews it regularly. 
In respect of the volume of the remuneration, the recommendation lays a stress 
on the appropriate amount thereof, which is determined based on a performance 
evaluation. According to the above code, the volume of the appropriate 
remuneration is primarily based on the responsibilities and personal performance 
of the relevant board member and the economic condition, successes and 
prospects of the company. The recommendation also proposes the consideration 
of comparative factors. The code emphasizes that upon the determination of the 
remuneration the remuneration practices applied by competitors comparable to 
the company should also be taken into consideration.25
The British UK Corporate Governance Code also recommends that the 
remuneration of executive directors be structured so as to link rewards to corporate 
and individual performance.26 As another requirement, payments or benefits 
should be subject to the company’s performance. The UK Corporate Governance 
23 See HILL, Jennifer G., Regulatory Responses to Global Corporate Scandals, Wisconsin International 
Law Journal (2005) No. 3, Page 408.
24 See Budapest Stock Excahnge, Corporate Governance Recommendations 2.7.1
Available at (10. November, 2012.) : http://www.bet.hu/data/cms61378/FTA_080516.doc,  
25 See Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex 4.2.2
Available at (November 10, 2012): http://www.corporate-governance-code.de/eng/download/
kodex_2012/D_CorGov_final_May_2012.pdf
26 See The UK Corporate Governance Code (2012) D.1 (Main Principle) Available at (November 10, 
2012): https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/a7f0aa3a-57dd-4341-b3e8-ffa99899e154/UK-Corporate-
Governance-Code-September-2012.aspx,
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Code also emphasizes the consideration of the application of performance 
indices that reflect the company’s performance as compared to its competitors 
(for example, shareholder yield can reflect such performance). In relation to the 
scheduling of payments, the code proposes that grants under incentive schemes 
should be phased rather than awarded in one large block.27 According to the UK 
Corporate Governance Code, levels of remuneration for non-executive directors 
should reflect the time commitment and responsibilities of the role.28 
The ASX Principles of Good Corporate Governance also considers appropriate 
relation between performance and remuneration as essential. However, in respect 
of the principles governing the determination of remuneration, it emphasizes 
that such principles should be sufficiently transparent and understandable for 
investors. It attaches particular importance to performance indicators both in the 
case of performance based and share based remuneration schemes. At the same 
time, it considers the fundamental objective of remuneration to promote the long-
term growth and success of the company.29 
Nevertheless, we are facing a significant issue, if, in order to boost the 
performance of the management of the company, we attach the remuneration of 
the management to shareholders wealth. This approach primarily requires that we 
define the meaning of shareholders wealth, and identify the most reliable indicator 
of the increase of the company’s value. According to the Efficient Capital Market 
Hypothesis, the market price of securities reflects the reasonable price as closely 
as possible.30 This hypothesis is based on the assumption that all public and 
accessible information are fully incorporated into share prices, therefore share 
prices reliably reflect the foregoing.31 
In light of the above mentioned, we may conclude that share prices are can 
be considered the most reliable indicators of the performance of companies, 
reflecting not only previous performance, but future expectations as well. We 
do not agree with this opinion in its generality. Moreover, this approach is 
questionable also from the sole perspective of remuneration, as it shows very little 
of the personal performance of the manager in charge of a particular division of 
27 See The UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) Schedule A
Available at (November 10, 2012): https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/a7f0aa3a-57dd-4341-b3e8-
ffa99899e154/UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-September-2012.aspx,
28 See The UK Corporate Governance Code (2012) D.1.3
Available at (November 10, 2012):  https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/a7f0aa3a-57dd-4341-b3e8-
ffa99899e154/UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-September-2012.aspx
29 See ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (with 2010 Amendments) 
Principle 8
Available at (November 10, 2012): http://www.asx.com.au/documents/about/cg_principles_
recommendations_with_2010_amendments.pdf,
30 See MERKT, Hanno, European Company Law Reform: Struggling for a More Liberal Approach, 
European Company and Financial Law Review (2004) No. 1, page  8.
31 See STEENO, Annaleen, Note: Corporate Governance: Economic Analysis of a „Comply or 
Explain” Approach, Stanford Journal of Law, Business and Finance (2005-2006) No. 2, Page 397. 
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a company. However, the observation that the market does not always operate as 
efficiently as described above raises a more serious problem. Moreover, elements 
outside the scope of activity of the board also have an influence over share prices. 
Furthermore, there is a possibility that in order to receive higher remuneration, the 
management attempts to influence share prices in the short run. Despite all of the 
foregoing considerations, we are to admit that although the share price cannot be 
considered as the indicator of economic efficiency, it is also difficult to find any 
other, more precise indicator. 
Accounting indicators can also be used as performance indicators, although 
they are frequently none the less inaccurate. Moreover, there is a possibility of 
abuse in respect of their application. The manipulation of accounting data by the 
management was a rather frequent practice following the turn of the millennium. 
Thus the management of the company can accelerate or delay earnings and 
expenses, and such manipulation may influence the results of the quarterly 
and annual financial statements. The most significant danger involved in the 
application of accounting indicators and the related manipulations is that they 
result in a short-term approach, which may drive the management to inflate short-
term financial results to the detriment of long-term results (for example, it reduces 
the amount intended for advertisement and research and development).32 
With reference to the findings of an empirical research on this topic, it is to be 
noted that the majority of British companies rely on earnings per share33 and the 
total shareholder return34 when determining the performance indicator of long-
term incentive schemes. 42% of the FTSE 100 companies used total shareholder 
return based indices, while 56% of such companies used earnings per share in their 
delayed long-term annual bonus schemes, according to the 2006 Mercer report.35
Iv. tHE oPtIon
Share options granted for remuneration purposes transfer to the management 
the right, but not the obligation to purchase a specified portion of the company’s 
shares for a specified price (exercise price) until or prior to a specified date.36 
Thus, we may establish that the option granted for remuneration purposes are 
purchase options in the sense of private law-dogmatics. Frequently, employee 
share options can be exercised only upon the expiry of a certain vesting period 
 
32 See: MCCAHERY, Joseph A. – RENNEBOOG, Luc, Managerial Remuneration: The Indirect Pay-
For-Performance Relation, Journal of Corporate Law Studies (2001) December, Pages 324-326.
33 EPS: Earnings Per Share
34 TSR: Total Shareholder Return
35 Mercer, Performance Measures, Moving Beyond EPS and Relative TSR, (2006) No.3.
Available at: http://www.mercer.com/erperspectiveeu,.
36 See AGGARWAL, Rajesh, Executive Compensation and Corporate Controversy, Vermont Law 
Review (2003) summer, Page 853. 
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and/or subject to the fulfillment of certain conditions (for example, a minimal 
increase of the share price).37
In the United States the spreading of share option based remuneration played the 
most important part in the massive increase of executive compensation amounts. 
However, this remuneration element is less significant in Europe, where its 
application was always met with reserve. Professionals were further strengthened 
in their reserve by the fact that the previously mentioned Royal Ahold company, 
which practiced remuneration in the form of substantial share options, collapsed 
due to an audit scandal almost simultaneously with the US companies.38 
Professors Thomas E. Copeland39 and J. Fred Weston40 however examined the 
advantageous effects of remuneration in the form of share options. Their research 
published in 1992 presents three hypotheses to support the presumption that 
following the announcement of options for remuneration purposes share prices 
will increase. According to the incentive hypothesis, the advantage provided to 
shareholders by the option scheme exceeds the costs of shareholders incurred in 
respect of the manager incentive provided on the basis of such option schemes. 
The signaling hypothesis may have significance from the perspective of the 
value judgment of investors. Accordingly, if the managers take over the shares 
of a company, they will accept a portion of their remuneration in options, which 
clearly signals that they are confident about the company’s (future) performance. 
The tax hypothesis points out the favorable tax status41 of option arrangements. 
According to such hypothesis, the after tax pay-offs of a salary and share option 
plan are superior to those of a salary and bonus plan.42 Moreover, it can be 




37 European Commission - Enterprise Directorate-General, Employee Stock Options – The Legal and 




38 See HILL, Jennifer G., Regulatory Responses to Global Corporate Scandals, Wisconsin International 
Law Journal (2005) No. 3, Page 408.
39 Thomas E. Copeland, researcher at the Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International Security 
Studies at Pittsburgh University.  
40 J. Fred Weston, Professor Emeritusa at the University of California Los Angeles (UCLA).
41 See ERCSEY, Zsombor – SZILOVICS, Csaba, Innovation in Tax Systems, CD material of the 
conference on „Intellectual capital as competitive advantage”, Lifelong Learning Foundation – Selye 
János University, Faculty of Economy, Komarno (Slovakia), 2010
42 KELLS, Stuart – ROGERS, Mark, Executive Remuneration, Board Structure, Corporate Strategy 
and Firm Performance: A Taste of the Literature, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social 
Research - The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute Working Paper (October, 1997) No. 22, 
Pages 12-13. 
Available at: http://www.melbourneinstitute.com/wp/wp1997n22.pdf,
Dr. András Kecskés: Schemes of executive remuneration and its...
Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Splitu, god. 51, 3/2014., str. 659.- 680.
668
have the significant advantage that, unlike cash bonuses,43 they do not result in an 
immediate drain on liquidity, while their incentive effect is immediate.44
The danger of the application of share options lies in the fact that the share 
price increase, which is in the interest of the management, is implemented without 
a parallel value-increasing investment project. 
Furthermore, remuneration by way of options may motivate the management 
to reduce the amount of dividend payments and repurchase the company’s own 
shares (this being a suitable means of increasing demand and share prices). The 
increase of paid dividends results in the decrease of the value of stock options. This 
is the reason why CEOs holding substantial stock options prefer share repurchase 
to dividend payment (as it was pointed out by Jolls in a 1998 analysis)45.
The profits to be earned by way of options are, to a significant extent, subject to 
share price increase. Therefore, it represents a serious risk that in order to increase 
share price the management is willing to launch extremely risky transactions. 
Moreover, similarly to the decrease of share prices, their increase is also frequently 
due to reasons other than the performance of the management. Such reasons may 
include industry developments or a strong capital market.46 The exercising of 
the option, and the acquisition of the company’s share by the management have 
further effects, since as a result of the foregoing, the management of the company 
can obtain significant voting rights, and this may contribute to the cementation of 
their positions. From an investment technique perspective, the concentration of 
the management’s significant interests within a single company may also result in 
excessive risk avoidance.47
In relation to remuneration in the form of options there is a possibility that the 
management can manipulate share prices so as to achieve higher compensation. 
In the course of such manipulation the management may reduce the share price 
before the granting of the option, and then increase it upon the exercising of the 
option. According to certain researches – for example, the findings of professors 
43 Cf. SZILOVICS, Csaba, Stability and Calculability Regarding the Transformation of the 
Hungarian Legal Order 1985-2005, in: JAKAB, András – TAKáCS, Péter – TATHAM, Allan F. (eds.), 
The transformation of the Hungarian legal order 1985-2005: transition to the rule of law and accession to 
the European Union, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2007, Pages 169-170.
44 European Commission - Enterprise Directorate-General, Stock Options – The Legal and 
Administrative Environment for Employee Stock Options in the EU, Final Report of the Expert Group 
(2003) June 21. 
See: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/entrepreneurship/support_measures/stock_options/final_report_
stock_en.pdf
45 See HALL, Brian J., The Pay to Performance Incentives of Executive Stock Options, National 
Bureau of Economic Research - Working Paper 6674 (1998) August, Page 25. 
Available at: http://www. nber.org/papers/w6674,
46 See MCCAHERY, Joseph A. – RENNEBOOG, Luc, Managerial Remuneration: The Indirect Pay-
For-Performance Relation, Journal of Corporate Law Studies (2001) December, Pages 326-327.
47 LOEWENSTEIN, Mark J., The Conundrum of Executive Compensation, Wake Forest Law Review 
(2000) No. 1, Page 13.
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David Aboody48 and Ron Kasznik49 – in (typically Anglo-Saxon) countries, where 
capital markets have high proportions of free float shares, due to the advantages 
following from its position, the management may not only be willing to use 
such manipulations, but it also has the appropriate means to do so.50 According 
to their position, there is empirical evidence verifying that CEOs schedule the 
announcement of news so that they precede (bad news) or follow (good news) 
the granting of options.51 Naturally, similar manipulations and insider trading 
are considered unlawful in most countries; nevertheless, it may happen that the 
director secures for himself the grant of an option when he considers that stock 
exchange rates are low.52 
It is to be noted as a significant principle that future options (that is, options 
exercisable within e.g.  4 years) may represent substantial incentives, while 
immediately exercisable options represent only minimal incentive.53 The 
acceptance of the option is a significant signal to the market (signaling hypothesis), 
since such acceptance and the nature of the option indicate that the management, 
being aware of the actual economic condition of the company, have confidence 
in getting their money by exercising the option right. This may lead to the 
conclusion that the option specified in the remuneration contract subject to certain 
conditions provides appropriate incentive for the particular manager to continue 
his activity at the company. Therefore, it can be established that the disclosure of 
the remuneration contracts of the management and the remunerations of the form 
of options may provide information on the economic position and prospects of the 
company.
However, the fact that the undiversified options of the management are 
significantly more exposed than the investments of the majority of shareholders 
involves a risk for the management. For shareholders holding diversified 
portfolios the primary objective is to maximize the amount of the obtainable yield. 
In this context, shareholders do not shy away from expecting the undertaking of 
significant risks by the companies in the shareholder’s portfolio. If any of these 
companies suffers substantial losses, the extraordinary profit gained as a result of 
the assumption of risk by another company can easily compensate such loss. 
48 David Aboody, Professor of Accounting at the University of California Los Angeles (UCLA).
49 Ron Kasznik, Professor of Accounting at Stanford University Graduate School of Business.
50 See HILL, Jennifer – YABLON, Charles M., Corporate Governance and Executive Remuneration: 
Rediscovering Managerial Positional Conflict, University of New South Wales Law Journal (2002) No. 
2, Pages 308-309.
51 See PERRY, Tod – ZENNER, Marc, CEO Compensation in the 1990’s: Shareholder Alignment or 
Shareholder Expropriation?, Wake Forest Law Review (2000) Page 141. 
52 See BOOTH, Richard A., Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, and the Partner 
Manager, University of Illinois Law Review (2005) No. 1, Pages 285-290.
53 See BAINBRIDGE, Stephen M., Book Review: Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Executive 
Compensation: Who Decides? – Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive 
Compensation (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2004), Texas Law Review, (2005) No. 83, Page 
1623. 
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Based on the foregoing, we may come to the intriguing conclusion that 
managers exposed to their options are more interested in the future of the company 
than the shareholders.54 However, in light of the corporate scandals and hazardous 
financial ventures of recent years, there is a possibility that the above principle 
cannot prevail in practice. In this respect, the techniques allowing the management 
to avoid the risks affecting their compensation due to exchange rate decrease are 
also instrumental. The gaining ground of techniques such as derivative trade and 
various deferred trading techniques indicate the above efforts.55 Furthermore, in 
order to prevent the abuse of insider information, the prohibition of the immediate 
sale of shares acquired by way of the exercising of the option might be of 
relevance.56 
Moreover – as it was pointed out by Eli Ofek57 and David Larry Yermack58– 
it is also to be considered corporate executives frequently sell their previously 
acquired shares when they receive the new shares subject to a limitation on 
alienation, or the new option schemes. 59
v. InDEXED oPtIonS
The optimization of the incentive power of options is essential in order to 
establish an appropriate remuneration policy. Such optimization can be achieved 
by way of specifying well-reasoned vesting conditions. The performance of the 
management is more precisely reflected, if the amount of the proceeds achievable 
from the option is subject to the performance of the company as compared to 
its competitors. This solution eliminates the risk of undeserved or excessive 
compensation, which may result from the management taking advantage of market 
processes, instead of increasing the company’s efficiency. In this context indexed 
options represent significant means, which contribute not only to the elimination 
of the risk of excessive compensation, but this method can also reduce the risks 
undertaken by the management. It represents a risk in respect of the remuneration 
of the company’s management that such remuneration is influenced by external 
54 See: BOOTH, Richard A., Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, and the Partner 
Manager, Legal University of Illinois Law Review (2005) No. 1, Pages 276-277.
55 See: HILL, Jennifer – YABLON, Charles M., Corporate Governance and Executive Remuneration: 
Rediscovering Managerial Positional Conflict, University of New South Wales Law Journal (2002) No. 
2, Page 308.
56 European Commission - Enterprise Directorate-General, Employee Stock Options – The Legal and 
Administrative Environment for Employee Stock Options in the EU, Final Report of the Expert Group 
(2003) June 8, Page 15.
Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/entrepreneurship/support_measures/stock_options/final_
report_stock_en.pdf,
57 Eli Ofek, Professor of Finance at the University of New York, Leonard N. Stern School of Business.
58 David Larry Yermack, Assistant at the Department of Economics at the University of New York, 
Leonard N. Stern School of Business.
59 See PERRY, Tod – ZENNER, Marc, CEO Compensation in the 1990’s: Shareholder Alignment or 
Shareholder Expropriation, Wake Forest Law Review (2000) No. 1, Pages 139-140. 
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factors, such as the general issues of the given business and sector, or negative 
market developments and recessions. Thus, even in the case of a drop in exchange 
rates, it is possible that the management of the company took all measures within 
its power to protect the interests of the company. Consequently, the performance 
of the management cannot be evaluated purely on the basis of share price changes. 
However, their relative performance can be measured based on the proportion of 
dividend paid by (similar) companies operating within the same industry to their 
shareholders, or as compared to the exchange rate changes of the securities of 
such companies. Such relative performance can provide a sufficiently objective 
basis for the determination of remuneration.60 
In the case that the management receives additional compensation only after 
the company specific share price increase, namely, the share price increase 
as compared to competitors, this may contribute to a compensation scheme 
rewarding only the management’s own activity and results. However, this method 
cannot eliminate certain company specific issues, which can hardly be attributed 
to the performance of the management. Moreover, there is a possibility that in 
the middle of the option period the company lags behind in the competition with 
rival companies, thus the management may deem the company’s prospects rather 
gloomy. In such case the indexed option would provide the management with little 
incentive, as they can no longer exert any substantial influence on the position of 
the company. The foregoing situation can be avoided by adjusting the exercise 
price to a specific segment of competitors, e.g. the back rear segment, the back 
quarter segment through the instrumentality of a partial index. 
We also need to present the operational mechanism of indexed options. If 
the share price of the companies within a given market segment increases on the 
average by 10%, the exercise price of the option will increase accordingly. It is 
obvious that in such case substantial payments can be made, only if the company 
performs significantly better than its competitors. Rendering the exercising 
of options subject to specified conditions can also have considerable incentive 
effect. In this case the option granted as remuneration can be exercised by the 
management of the company, only if they achieve specified performance targets.61 
Naturally, the indexed option should carry with itself a significant chance of 
payment, thereby motivating the management. However, while the probability 
of payment is 80% in the case of average options, it is only 50% in the case of 
indexed options. Therefore, when devising an indexed option, the probability of 
payment needs to be increased, so as to ensure the appropriate incentive power.62 
60 See: FERRARINI, Guido and MOLONEY, Niamh, Executive Remuneration and Corporate 
Governance in the EU: Convergence, Divergence, and Reform Perspectives, European Company and 
Financial Law Review (2004) No. 3, Pages 264-266.
61 See BEBCHUK, Lucian Arye – FRIED, Jesse M. – WALKER, David I., Managerial Power and 
Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, The University of Chicago Law Review (2002) 
No. 3, Pages 799-801. 
62 See BEBCHUK, Lucian Arye – FRIED, Jesse M. – WALKER, David I., Managerial Power and 
Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, The University of Chicago Law Review (2002) 
No. 3, Pages 808-809.
Dr. András Kecskés: Schemes of executive remuneration and its...
Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Splitu, god. 51, 3/2014., str. 659.- 680.
672
vI. oPtIMAL oPtIon contRActS 
The details and conditions in relation to the granting of options are contained in 
the option plan. In the case of the majority of options there is a vesting schedule, 
which is determined under the option plan. For example, 10% of the option is 
vested on a six monthly basis, thus the full vesting period will be five years, with a 
further five year maturity period.63 Option plans may prescribe a minimum period 
for the retaining of the option, and following the exercising of the option the 
retaining of the share. Generally speaking, employee stock options are mostly 
“American type” options. At this point it is to be noted that there is an overall 
difference between American and European type options. In the case of American 
type options, the owner of the option can exercise the option at any time within 
a specified time period. In the case of European type options, the owner of the 
option is obliged to wait until the end of the specified period and then decide 
whether to exercise the option.64
It is also a frequently used technique that options can be exercised only 
within short time intervals. Such time interval usually occurs shortly after the 
presentation of the annual financial statement or the general meeting. The option 
contract may also include provisions which ensure that managers cannot sell 
their shares immediately upon exercising the option. Such contracts ensure that 
corporate executives retain their securities for a further specified minimum time 
period. There may be stipulations ensuring that the right to exercise the option is 
rendered subject to relevant performance indicators of the company, for example, 
the minimum increase of share prices. In this case, if the specified increase in 
share prices is achieved within the time interval stipulated in the option plan – but 
only in such case – the option will become exercisable. In the case of long-term 
options it is particularly important that the performance objectives to be achieved 
are sufficiently attractive.65
Upon formulating the option contract it is to be taken into consideration that, 
due to its approach aimed at the avoidance of risks, the management will certainly 
strive to convert the option into cash as soon as possible. The management may 
be willing to do so, even if this results in a significant decrease in the value of the 
option, as compared to the value that could be achieved otherwise. Therefore, 
63 See AGGARWAL, Rajesh, Executive Compensation and Corporate Controversy, Vermont Law 
Review (2003) summer, Page 853.
64 European Commission - Enterprise Directorate-General, Employee Stock Options – The Legal and 
Administrative Environment for Employee Stock Options in the EU - Final Report of the Expert Group 
(2003) June, Page 12.
Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/entrepreneurship/support_measures/stock_options/final_
report_stock_en.pdf
65 European Commission - Enterprise Directorate-General, Employee Stock Options – The Legal and 
Administrative Environment for Employee Stock Options in the EU, Final Report of the Expert Group 
(2003) June, Page 14.
Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/entrepreneurship/support_measures/stock_options/final_
report_stock_en.pdf
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in certain cases the optimal compensation contract should include a provision 
stipulating that following its transfer, the option may not be converted to any other 
value for a definite period of time. 
Such solution is also justified by the fact that based on a related empirical 
research, 10 year options granted by the forty largest US companies were 
exercised within the average of 5.8 years. Consequently, it is advisable to include 
in compensation contracts a clause which guarantees that for a definite period of 
time the manager acquiring the option must not reduce or minimize the financial 
risk in respect of the option, and must not sell, or otherwise alienate such option. 
Therefore, stock options provided for compensation purposes are typically not 
vested at the time when they are granted, namely, managers cannot immediately 
exercise them. Subject to the provisions of the inserted clause, managers may 
need to wait for several years before they can exercise their options. Furthermore, 
the transfer of stock options frequently provides only partial   entitlement, for 
example, only a certain percentage of the options vest each year.66
The determination of the exercise price is an essential element of corporate 
stock option plans. There are three possible solutions for determining the exercise 
price. According to empirical observations in the US, the majority of options 
granted to the management are so-called at the money options, that is, the exercise 
price is close to the share price effective on the date of the granting of the share 
on which the option is based. A relatively small number of companies (approx. 
2%) issue so-called in the money options, in the case of which the exercise price 
is lower than the share price effective on the date of the granting of the option. An 
even smaller number of companies (approx. 1%) issue so-called out of the money 
options, also called premium options. In this latter case, the exercise price is higher 
than the share price effective on the date of the granting of the option. It can be 
generally established that the majority of companies apply several year option 
plans, in which they use a fixed number of shares (that is, they annually grant a 
fixed number of shares), or adopt a fixed value plan (that is, they annually grant 
shares of a fixed value).67 Another research also indicates that 95% of companies 
issue at the money options.68 
In the case of a major market crisis (such as the 2008/2009 financial crisis), it 
may raise problems that due to the lower share prices, companies applying fixed 
66 European Commission - Enterprise Directorate-General, Employee Stock Options – The Legal and 
Administrative Environment for Employee Stock Options in the EU, Final Report of the Expert Group 
(2003) June, Page 14. 
Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/entrepreneurship/support_measures/stock_options/final_
report_stock_en.pdf 
67 See HALL, Brian J., The Pay to Performance Incentives of Executive Stock Options - Working 
Paper 6674, National Bureau of Economic Research (1998) August, Page  8. 
Available at: http://www. nber.org/papers/w6674
68 See BEBCHUK, Lucian Arye – FRIED, Jesse M. – WALKER, David I., Managerial Power and 
Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, The University of Chicago Law Review (2002) 
No. 3, Page 817.
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value plans are to provide a larger number of shares as fixed value compensation. 
This practice may increase the dilution of shares, namely, the management 
acquiring the shares could obtain increasingly significant voting power. In the case 
of companies granting a fixed number of shares the value of the compensation will 
decrease simultaneously with the foregoing.69 However, in the case of a possible 
crisis, it is not an optimal message either fore the market, or in terms of PR, if 
a company increases the number of shares granted as compensation. It can be 
proposed only in the case of companies with excellent performance that they only 
moderately increase the number of shares granted in light of the market downturn. 
Upon examining employee preferences, we may establish that the most 
popular solutions are at the money options and in the money options. According 
to a study by professors Brian J. Hall70 and Kevin J. Murphy, managers prefer 
smaller options of lower exercise prices to larger options of higher exercise prices. 
In this respect it was also demonstrated that in the case that the option is added 
to the already existing compensation scheme, as a further element, without the 
decrease of other elements, in the case of options with the highest incentive power 
the exercise price is much the same as the market price effective on the date when 
the option is granted. If the stock option is not attached to the already existing 
compensation package, the maximum incentive can be achieved, if the exercise 
price is lower than the market price effective on the date when the option is granted. 
High exercise prices jeopardize payment, which in turn reduces incentive power 
for managers who tend to avoid risks.71 In summary, we may further establish 
that options are more valuable from the perspective of the employee, if they fall 
within the category of at the money options and in the money options. However, 
from the (subjective) perspective of the employer out of the money options and 
at the money options seem to be the most cost-efficient. We may conclude from 
the foregoing that options are to be issued at the money. This conclusion also 
corresponds to the findings of professors Bebchuk, Fried and Walker.72
In relation to the re-pricing of option, we are to refer to a further observation 
by professors Bebchuk, Fried and Walker. According to their study, options are 
typically re-priced in the case of market downturns. Re-pricing proves ineffective 
in the case of market growth, although this would be necessary in relation to 
the objective evaluation of manager performance.  On the other hand, re-pricing 
presumed by the management   may have a distorting effect on their incentives.73 
69 Mercer, Executive Remuneration Perspective Europe - Managing Executive Remuneration in an 
Economic Downturn (2008) No. 4.
 Available at: http://www.mercer.no/summary.htm?idContent=1331175
70 Brian J. Hall, Professor at Harvard University 
71 MURPHY, Kevin J., Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power vs. the Perceived 
Cost of Stock Options, University of Chicago Law Review (2002) summer, Page 864.
72 MURPHY, Kevin J., Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power vs. the Perceived 
Cost of Stock Options, University of Chicago Law Review (2002) summer,  Page 864.
73 MURPHY, Kevin J., Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power vs. the Perceived 
Cost of Stock Options, University of Chicago Law Review (2002) summer, Page 865.
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In light of the foregoing, it is advisable that corporate executives are given no 
prior assurances regarding possible re-pricing.
For example, according to Warren Buffett74, growing rich by way of a ten year 
at the money option dos not require too much effort. If no dividends are paid for 
a ten years, instead such funds are invested by the management of the company 
into government bonds, share prices will, in all probability, increase during those 
years. As a result, with the general increase in market prices, the “at the money 
option” will become an “in the money option” during those years.75 
vII. RESoLUtIon on SHARE oPtIon  
bASED REMUnERAtIon 
The increasing significance of share options, the high level of compensation 
achievable by their application, the complicated nature of such schemes and 
the risks involved in their application rightly raise the issue which organ of the 
company is to exercise control over option based benefits? For this reason, we 
consider it is necessary to review the regulations of some relevant corporate 
governance codes in this respect.
According to the Corporate Governance Recommendations of the BSE, in 
the case of share based compensation schemes the elements of the schemes are 
approved by the general meeting, and in the case of the board of directors and the 
members of the supervisory board also the amount of actual benefits. In the case of 
the members of the management, the approval of the amount of the actual benefits 
falls within the scope of authority of the board of directors, instead of the general 
meeting. The Recommendations of the BSE emphasize the significance of ensuring 
that shareholders receive appropriate access to information. Consequently, the 
provisions of the Recommendations propose that prior to voting shareholders 
should be provided with detailed information on the share-based remuneration 
schemes (and any possible amendments thereto) and the costs such schemes 
entail. The source of shares intended to be granted as compensation should also 
be identified. In the case of share based compensation schemes, the prior approval 
of the general meeting is required for the determination of the relevant parts of 
the compensation contract. The Recommendations also propose that the company 
determine the compensation schemes for the board of directors, the supervisory 
board and the management in such manner, that it serves the strategic interests of 
the company, and thereby those of the shareholders.76
74 Warren Edward Buffett the “Sage of Omaha”, investor, businessman, one of the wealthiest persons 
in the world. His investment institute is Berkshire Hathaway. 
75 See: BEBCHUK, Lucian Arye – FRIED, Jesse M. – WALKER, David I., Managerial Power and 
Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, The University of Chicago Law Review (2002) 
No. 3, Page 819.
76 Budapest Stock Exchange, Corporate Governance Recommendations 2.7.4
Available at (Novembe 25., 2012):,http://www.bet.hu/data/cms61378/FTA_080516.doc 
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The recommendations of the British UK Corporate Governance Code apply 
the method of the delayed vesting of share based benefits due to the above 
described reasons. Therefore, the code especially emphasizes that shares granted 
or other forms of deferred remuneration should not vest, and options should not 
be exercisable, in less than three years. Moreover, the recommendation proposes 
that directors should be encouraged to hold their shares for a further period after 
vesting or exercise by means further to the foregoing compensation.77 In relation 
to long-term compensation schemes, the recommendation emphasizes that such 
schemes should be approved by the shareholders.78 According to the code, as a 
principal rule, the remuneration for non-executive directors should not include 
share options, apart from exceptional cases.79
The Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex also sets forth that relevant 
comparison parameters  should be used in the case of share options and other 
similar schemes (for example, several year prohibition on the alienation of the 
company’s shares). However, it is also essential that such comparison parameters 
cannot be changed in the future and provide a stable standard for performance. 
Moreover, for extraordinary developments a possibility of limitation (cap) must 
in general be agreed upon by the supervisory board.80
According to the ASX Principles of Good Corporate Governance, share based 
remuneration based remuneration can be an effective form of the compensation 
and motivation of corporate executives. However, in this respect the code considers 
it necessary that companies link such compensation to performance targets. It is 
to be noted that the Australian code expressly refers to the fact that the ‘short-
termism’ of corporate executives may result in abuse. Therefore, it is essential to 
design share based remuneration portfolios in advance.81
77 The UK Corporate Governance Code (2012) Schedule A
Available at (November 25, 2012):, https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/a7f0aa3a-57dd-4341-b3e8-
ffa99899e154/UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-September-2012.aspx
78 The UK Corporate Governance Code (2012) Schedule A
Available at (November 25, 2012): https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/a7f0aa3a-57dd-4341-b3e8-
ffa99899e154/UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-September-2012.aspx 
79 The UK Corporate Governance Code (2012) D.1.3
Available at (November 25, 2012): , https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/a7f0aa3a-57dd-4341-
b3e8-ffa99899e154/UK-Corporate-Governance-Code-September-2012.aspx
80 Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex 4.2.3
Available at (November 25, 2012):, http://www.corporate-governance-code.de/eng/download/
kodex_2012/D_CorGov_final_May_2012.pdf
81 ASX Principles of Good Corporate Governance Box 8.1
Available at (November 25, 2012): http://www.asx.com.au/documents/about/cg_principles_
recommendations_with_2010_amendments.pdf,
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vIII. SHARES SUbJEct to PRoHIbItIon  
of ALIEnAtIon 
According to the position assumed by Hall and Murphy, the so-called non-
tradeable restricted stock offer an alternative more efficient than the option based 
remuneration of the management.82 This remuneration method can be interpreted 
as an option of zero exercise price. In this case the company’s shares are granted 
to the management as remuneration, and such shares cannot be alienated for a 
specified period of time. As a result, it is the primary interest of the management 
to ensure the appropriate increase of the share price within such time period, in 
order to achieve the highest possible remuneration. The ownership of the shares 
also provides the management with the right to receive dividends. This solution 
could prove to be optimal, since the promoting of an optimal dividend policy is 
far more desirable for the management, if they hold non-tradeable restricted stock. 
In contrast, holding an option right does not entitle the holder to dividends, thus 
it rewards only the increase of share prices. Consequently, the management will 
strive to increase only the share price. However, the management can achieve 
such objective by paying low dividends and re-purchasing shares to the detriment 
of investor interests.83 
As a further advantage of non-tradeable restricted stock, they represent a 
relatively more stable incentive than stock options. The incentive power of stock 
options is based on the amount of the difference between the exercise price and 
the market price. In such cases the option provides appropriate incentive power 
as long as the market price significantly exceeds the exercise price of the option. 
However, the incentive power diminishes when the market price drops significantly 
below the exercise price. In such case the scheme loses its value and attractive 
force. The management cannot obtain any pecuniary advantage through a loss-
making scheme. At this point the option as incentive force becomes pointless. 
Such options are called underwater options.84 In this case the company may 
be forced to reduce the exercise price of the option by re-pricing, or issue new, 
supplementary options at a lower exercise price. When applying such solutions, it 
may prove difficult to determine the optimal extent of re-pricing. Non-tradeable 
restricted stock is suitable also for the settlement of such issues. Moreover, they 
can also reduce the chances of the management undertaking excessive risks in 
relation to specific transactions. 
In order to see the whole picture, we should briefly mention the disadvantages 
of the foregoing solution. As a drawback, we may refer to the fact that such 
 
82 non-tradeable restricted stock
83 See HALL, Brian J. – MURPHY, Kevin J., The Trouble with Stock Options, Journal of Economic 
Perspective (2003) summer, Pages 49-70.
84 underwater options
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share grants may result in the immediate dilution of shares,85 thereby reducing 
the amount of the dividend per share as well. Moreover, the provision of an 
excessively large number of such shares may result in a drastic increase in the 
management’s voting rights (while no voting rights can be exercised in respect of 
option based remuneration.) 
IX. PUbLIcIty AnD DIScLoSURE obLIGAtIon 
The control mechanisms of publicity have a key role in corporate governance. 
This is particularly true as regards the issue of remuneration. In order to ensure the 
operation of such control mechanisms it is essential to prescribe that information 
regarding remuneration and the principles of the remuneration policy are 
accessible to the shareholders. This objective can be achieved by the publication of 
the remuneration policy or the so-called remuneration statement (statement). The 
control of publicity renders it necessary for the body determining remuneration 
to sufficiently support and justify the principles of the company’s remuneration 
practice. Moreover, certain aspects of publication may also indicate the increasing 
importance of the role of remuneration committees. Corporate governance 
provides more possibilities for shareholders to exercise control functions, 
moreover, it may promote a more active control by institutional investors. As a 
result of the foregoing, shareholders may have a more extensive overview of the 
remuneration of corporate executives, as well as the various aspects of formulating 
the remuneration policy. However, insufficient or deficient compliance with the 
publication obligations may cause significant damages, due partly to the fact that 
the determination of remuneration is a rather complex process. In our view, the 
primary principle of compliance with the publication obligations is that investors 
should understand the internal processes in light of the disclosed data.
Therefore, the publication of the so-called remuneration statement is an 
indispensable condition of the exercising of shareholders’ rights and publicity 
control. The above principle is kept in view by the majority of corporate governance 
recommendations. 
According to the relevant provisions of the Corporate Governance 
Recommendations of the BSE, the company should prepare a report for the owners, 
which report is to be submitted to the general meeting. The report should present 
the remuneration of executive officials and the members of the management, 
namely, the Recommendations of the BSE propose the full disclosure for each 
person separately. The remuneration committee provides for the preparation of 
the annually published remuneration statement.86
85 It is an unquestionable advantage of this solution that the extent of dilution can be precisely 
determined (numerically), while in the case of share options such dilution is subject to the changes in 
share prices.
86 Budapest Stock Exchange, Corporate Governance Recommendations 3.4.5.,
Available at (November 25, 2012): http://www.bet.hu/data/cms61378/FTA_080516.doc, 
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According to the Deutscher Corporate Governance Codex, the total 
compensation of each member of the board of directors is to be disclosed by name, 
divided into compensation components subject to and independent of performance 
and long-term incentive compensation elements, with the proviso that disclosure 
may be dispensed with if the General Meeting has passed a resolution to this effect 
by three-quarters qualified majority.87
The Australian ASX Principles of Good Corporate Governance stipulates that 
companies should provide disclosure in relation to their remuneration policies 
to enable investors to understand the costs and benefits of those policies and the 
link between remuneration paid to the board of directors and key executives and 
corporate performance. The related (specified) data shall be disclosed under the 
corporate governance section of the annual report.88
X. concLUSIon
Executive remuneration is one of the most topical aspects of corporate 
governance, the significance of which has substantially increased in light of the 
postmodern corporate scandals. In order to formulate a reasonable and efficient 
remuneration policy, the relevant legal and economic theories, as well as practical 
(empirical) observations need to be taken into consideration. It is essential that 
the established policy be at the same time suitable for motivation and in line 
with results, representing the performances on which such results are based. 
The foregoing aspects should be taken into consideration also upon selecting the 
appropriate remuneration components; however, it must be borne in mind that the 
nature of the motivation may be subject, to a significant extent, to the characteristics 
of the company, sector specific features, moreover, the individual circumstances 
of the executive officials. If we wish to determine the relation between and the 
appropriate proportion of fixed and share based compensation components, 
we are also to consider that the characteristics resulting from the operation of 
capital markets may render the evaluation of actual performance significantly 
more difficult. In light of the foregoing we may conclude that remuneration and 
compensation, as the components of the system of corporate governance, will 
remain in the center of interest in the future. There are still lessons to be learnt and 
improvements to be made in respect of best business practices, even upon drawing 
the consequences of the scandals brought about by the 2008/2009 financial crisis.
87 Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex 4.2.4 and 4.2.5
Available at (November 25, 2012): http://www.corporate-governance-code.de/eng/download/
kodex_2012/D_CorGov_final_May_2012.pdf
88 ASX Principles of Good Corporate Governance Recommendation 8.4
Available at (November 25, 2012): http://www.asx.com.au/documents/about/cg_principles_
recommendations_with_2010_amendments.pdf
Dr. András Kecskés: Schemes of executive remuneration and its...
Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Splitu, god. 51, 3/2014., str. 659.- 680.
680
obLIcI EGZEKUtIvnIH nAKnADA I nJIHovA 
REGULAcIJA nA RAZInI PREPoRUKA
Rast egzekutivnih kompenzacija ponovno pobuđuje pažnju. Ekonomisti i pravni analitičari sve 
se češće pitaju: 'Kako će sustav egzekutivnih naknada biti održiva struktura vođenja firme tamo 
gdje aspekti strateškog pristupa osiguravaju dugoročni razvoj?'. Skandal kojega je AIG imao 
2008-2009 (poznatiji pod imenom bonus gate scandal) otkrio je da se je federalna pomoć koju 
su dobivale financijske institucije djelomice koristio radi pokrivanja isplatnih interesa. Opću je 
indignaciju izazvala činjenica da je AIG pored 'isplate bonusa' u korist egzekutivaca kompanije dio 
federalne pomoći osigurao i drugim financijskim institucijama , ujključujući i europske banke. U 
međuvremenu su EU (u financijskoj sferi) i Švicarska (općenito prema svim poduzećima) zauzeli 
stajalište o ovome pitanju na način da su ograničili pakete egzekutivnioh naknada. U tekstu autor 
prikazuje glavne teorije primjene tih paketa za isplatu te razmatra regulativu na razini preporuke.
Ključne riječi: dobra praksa, bonus isplate, pretpostavke, preporuka, 
isplata, dionički udio
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